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ISSUES
The state of Maine, by statute, bans interstate impor-
tation of live baitfish. The principal question in this case
is whether the statutory import embargo can survive
federal constitutional scrutiny under the Commerce
Clause. f\ secondary question concerns the proper
standard of review to be applied by a federal appellate
court when it considers the rectitude of a lower court
decision.
FACTS
Factually, Maine v. Taylor is relatively easy to under-
stand. Maine law (12 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 76113)
forbids the importation into the state of "any live fish,
including smelts, which are commonly used for baitfish-
ing in inland waters." The federal Lacey Act Amend-
ments of 1981 (16 U.S.C.A. sections 3371 and 3372)
deem violation of state fish and game laws, like the
Maine live bait law, a violation of federal law. In 1983,
Robert Taylor was indicted on two counts by a federal
grand jury for violating the Lacey Act Amendments
incorporating the Maine live bait law and for conspiring
to do so.
Taylor, a businessman in Argyle, Maine, is a live bait
dealer. Responding to his inability to meet customer
demands for golden shiners from his own Maine bait
farm, Taylor in 1981 imported 158,000 golden shiners
(a live baitfish) from out-of-state sources. The shipment
was intercepted at the Maine border. The previously
mentioned federal indictment was handed down and
Taylor entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the
right to contest the constitutionality of the underlying
Maine statute as a violation of the Commerce Clause. If
the Maine law is found invalid, the indictment will Iike-
wise fall and be dismissed; if the Maine law is upheld,
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Issue No. 13
Taylor will stand convicted of violating the federal law
that incorporates the Maine bait fish import ban.
The procedural posture of the case is more difficult
to recount than is the factual setting. When Taylor chal-
lenged the indictment by attacking the constitutionality
of the Maine statute, the federal court, as required by
statute, informed the Maine Attorney General of the
challenge to Maine law. Maine intervened in the case, as
permitted by federal statute, for the limited purpose of
defending the law from Taylor's constitutional attack.
The federal prosecution thereafter moved through
several stages. First, the federal magistrate assigned to
the case, D. Brock Hornby, heard extensive evidence
regarding the purposes served by the Maine law and
alternatives by which Maine could protect itself against
the evils it sought to avoid through the baitfish import
ban. Hornby found the state's evidence persuasive that
imported baitfish introduced serious diseases not other-
wise present in Maine's indigenous baitfish population
and risked introduction into the Maine ecology of nu-
merous exotic species. He further found that baitfish
inspection techniques, either on import or at the place of
breeding, were not sufficiently validated and could not
protect Maine's important interest in protecting its bait-
fish population and ecology against the perils posed by
importation. In legal terms, he found that Maine had
carried its burden in demonstrating that the admittedly
discriminatory (against interstate commerce) statute was
the only feasible means of protecting an important state
interest.
The United States District Court for the District of
Maine upheld the magistrate's recommended ruling
(585 F. Supp. 393 (1984», and Taylor appealed. The
First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court
(752 F. 2d 757 (1985». The circuit court indicated that it
was less certain of the purpose of the statute than was
the court below. Economic protectionism, rather than
ecologic protectionism, was suggested as possibly being
the statute's true purpose. Nevertheless, the circuit court
opinion did not decide that issue; it held instead that the
Maine baitfish import ban was unconstitutional because
there were less restrictive means available to Maine by
which it could accomplish valid resource protective con-
cerns.
At this point the case took a final, rather picayune
procedural turn. Maine, not surprisingly, wanted to ap-
peal the invalidation of its baitfish law. The United
States, as the prosecuting authority in the case, was of
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the opinion that the case was not of broad significance
and did not itself wish to seek United States Supreme
Court review of the case. The United States took this
view despite its agreement with Maine's view that the law
was valid. Usually, only the United States can seek re-
view of federal court decisions dismissing its prosecu-
tions. Here, however, because Maine's law was truly .the
law in issue, the United States supported Maine's right
to appeal under the general statute (28 U.S.C. section
1254(2» governing appeals from the circuit courts to the
United States Supreme Court of cases invalidating state
laws as repugnant to the United States Constitution.
There is only a remote possibility that this procedural
aspect of the case will surface as an important issue in
the case, but it is worth noting that the invocation by
Maine of section 1254(2) in this setting is a bit novel.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
It is hard to measure the significance of this case
without first reading the United States Supreme Court's
opinion that ultimately decides it. Legally, the area of
interstate product import bans appears to be well-
settled. Laws like Maine's that are facially discriminatory
against interstate commerce must meet a very high bur-
den of justification, both as the legitimacy and impor-
tance of purposes and as to the lack of alternative less
burdensome to commerce. If the Supreme Court leaves
this basic doctine unaltered, the decision may center on
the latitude enjoyed by the circuit court of appeals when
it reviews a district court determination that a state, like
Maine, has met its high burden of proof on these issues.
Such an opinion will be enlightening to lower court and
appellatejudges, but not of vast significance.
If, instead, the Supreme Court in deciding this case
focuses extensively on the constitutional merits, the case
is of broader (but still not overwhelming) interest and
importance. State efforts to protect local resources from
threats posed by non-local parasites, diseases and exotic
species are vital to the well-being of major industries.
This much is apparent in episodes like California and
Florida attempting to restrict the spread of Med fly
infestation. IfMaine v. Taylor becomes a primer on how
to litigate challenges to such laws, it will shape much
subsequent litigation. The case holds some seeds for this
possibility. Maine's law is at once a plainly rational reo
sponse to an articulated ecologic danger and a plainly
protectionist measure that shields Maine bait fish pro·
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ducers from out-of-state competition. Learning what
arguments succeed in persuading the Supreme Court to
adopt one or the other view of such a statute is valuable
to future litigators on both sides of Commerce Clause
cases.
ARGUMENTS
FortheState ofMaine(Counsel, Cabanne Howard, State House,
Augusta, ME 04333;teleplume (207) 289-3661)
1. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of Maine's ap-
peal in this case.
2. The factual determinations of the magistrate,
adopted by the district court, were not clearly erro-
neous and were therefore not open to redetermina-
tion by the circuit court of appeals.
3. The Maine baitfish import ban serves vital state eco-
logic interests which cannot be adequately protected
by alternative means.
4. The incorporation of state fish and game laws by the
federal Lacey Act Amendments lessens the stringency
of Commerce Clause scrutiny to be applied in the
review of such state laws when subjected to constitu-
tional challenge.
For RobertJ. Taylor (Counsel of Record, E. Paul Eggert, 5
Milk Street, Box 427, Portland, ME 04112; teleplume (207)
775-3101)
1. The state of Maine may not properly invoke United
States Supreme Court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
section 1254(2) to appeal dismissal of a federal crimi-
nal appeal.
2. Maine's baitfish import ban violates the Commerce
Clause because strict scrutiny reveals its purposes
include economic protection of local interests against
interstate competition.
3. Maine's baitfish import ban violates the Commerce
Clause because there are alternative means by which
Maine can protect its ecology from the dangers asso-
ciated with baitfish importation.
For the United States (Supporting Maine) (Counsel,
DOllald A. Carr, Department of Justice, Waslliugtoll, DC
20530; telephone (202) 633·2217)
1. The United States joined in all of Maine's arguments
save that based on the Lacey Act Amendments of
1981.
PREVIEW
